Imagination and Belief by Sinhababu, Neil
Imagination and Belief
Neil Sinhababu – neiladri@gmail.com – National University of Singapore
Forthcoming in The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Imagination , edited by Amy Kind, Routledge
Belief and imagination are both states of mind that represent things as being a particular way.  
So one way of trying to understand the nature of imagination is by considering how it resembles belief  
and how it differs. If a concise statement of the similarities and differences between imagination and  
belief helps us understand how imagination works, and perhaps how the mind works in general, it'll  
provide a simple and illuminating theory of the imagination. While some philosophers propose 
theories on which imagination and belief are fundamentally similar or on a continuum with each 
other, others see the differences between imagination and belief as too deep for unified approaches to  
explain, and argue that these mental states must be understood in fundamentally different ways. 
This chapter surveys theories of imagination along both lines. I'll begin by considering the 
view that belief and imagination are fundamentally different, which is widely accepted by 
philosophers working on the imagination (including myself). Then I'll consider more unified ones on 
which there are intermediate states between belief and imagination, or on which they're similar except  
that we apply the normative aim of truth only to belief and not to imagination. Throughout, I'll focus 
on propositional imagination, in which we imagine that some state of affairs obtains -- for example,  
imagining that lava is flowing, as opposed to imagining lava. This may be the kind of imagination for  
which unified approaches are the most promising, since belief is a propositional attitude -- one can 
believe that lava is flowing, but it doesn't make sense to talk about believing lava. There are many  
other philosophically important topics that a chapter on belief and imagination might explore, 
including the complex relations between belief and imagination in supposition (Arcangeli 2014),  
aesthetics (Walton 1990), make-believe games (Walton 1993), and philosophical methodology (Gendler  
2010). But here I'll address such topics only insofar as they bear on general theories about what kind of  
mental state imagination is, and how much it's like and unlike belief. 
First I'll consider functional properties of belief which imagination doesn't seem to share, and 
which suggest treating them as broadly different mental states. Second I'll consider functional  
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properties of imagination which belief doesn't seem to share, which also support seeing the two states  
of mind as fundamentally different. Third will be the view of Shaun Nichols and Stephen Stich (2000),  
which accounts for pretense by treating the cognitive mechanisms involved in imagination and belief 
as fundamentally different. Fourth will be Susanna Schellenberg's (2013) arguments that cases of  
imaginative immersion demonstrate imagination and belief to be on a continuum ranging from pure 
imagination to pure belief. Fifth will be Andy Egan's (2008) arguments that accounting for 
psychological delusions requires mental states intermediate between imagination and belief. Sixth will  
be theories from John Urmson (1967), Lloyd Humberstone (1992), and Nishi Shah without (2003) and  
with David Velleman (2005), which explain the differences between belief and imagination not by  
appealing to the intrinsic properties of the representational states involved, but in terms of whether  
we apply a norm of truth to them. 
1. Properties of belief that imagination lacks
While believing and imagining both involve representations, broad differences between them 
suggest that they're fundamentally different kinds of representational states that can't be understood 
in any especially unified way. This section considers some central properties of belief, and describe  
how imagination doesn't share them. The next section will consider some properties of imagination,  
and describe how belief doesn't share them. 
Consider three properties that are attributed to belief on standard functionalist views, 
described by Eric Schwitzgebel (2006). First, beliefs create and eliminate other beliefs as the logical  
relations between their contents suggest. Believing that p, believing that if p then q, and attending to 
these propositions typically leads to forming the belief that q. We're strongly disposed to not believe 
contradictions when we attend to them. Second, perceptual states dispose us to believe that things are  
as we perceive them. When perceiving that p and attending to this feature of the perceived state of 
affairs, one typically forms the belief that p. Third, beliefs about what would raise the probability of 
desire-satisfaction interact with desires to motivate action. If one desires that d and believes that action 
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a would make d more likely, this will give one some motivation to a.1 As I'll describe, these properties 
of belief don't in general seem to be functional properties of imagination. 
First, belief and imagination don't have the same logical relations with each other that each has  
with states of its own kind. One can easily imagine that p while believing that not-p. I can imagine that 
I'm Spider-Man while believing that I'm not Spider-Man. As with belief, there are strong psychological  
pressures against explicitly imagining contradictions -- it's hard to simultaneously imagine that I'm 
Spider-Man and that I'm not Spider-Man, just as it's hard to believe both of these things. But if p is the 
content of belief and not-p is the content of imagination, or vice versa, we can easily hold onto both at  
once. It's easy to imagine that you're Spider-Man while believing that you're not Spider-Man. Our 
capacities for reasoning also lead us to imagine the logical consequences of what we imagine, when  
we attend properly to the premises and the conclusions. But even if beliefs interact with each other in  
the same way that imaginings interact with each other, belief and imagination don't in general interact  
with each other in these ways. If I imagine that I'm Spider-Man, and believe that Spider-Man doesn't  
exist, this won't lead me to believe or imagine that I don't exist. And if I imagine that I'm Spider-Man  
trying to shoot webs, and believe that if I try to shoot webs I'll fail, this won't lead me to imagine that  
I'll fail. While our beliefs about the world often influence what we imagine, we don't draw conclusions  
from a mix of believed and imagined propositions that we're attending to in the swift way that we  
believe the logical consequences of believed propositions that we're attending to, or in the swift way  
that we imagine the logical consequences of imagined propositions that we're attending to. When we  
fill in imagined scenarios with believed details, it's because the rules governing what we're supposed 
to imagine specifically allow us to do so, as Kendall Walton (1990, 1993) describes. 
Second, imagining comes unmoored from one's immediate sensory experiences far more easily 
than belief does. Readers of novels imagine characters and their interactions instead of the pages they  
see. Daydreamers imagine pleasant or exciting situations instead of their boring surroundings. Players 
of make-believe games imagine that objects in their games have properties different from those  
1 Schwitzgebel notes a fourth property: people are disposed to assert what they believe, under conditions 
favoring sincere assertion. But since assertion is an action, this seems to be a special case of the third 
functional property instead of a distinct fourth one.
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sensation presents. Believing that things aren't as our sensory experiences suggest typically requires a  
reason to doubt our experiences, and can involve some cognitive strain. But we typically imagine 
things being different from how our senses present them.
Third, one doesn't usually act on imagined means to ends in the way one acts on believed 
means to ends. Daydreaming about being Spider-Man typically doesn't result in actually trying to 
shoot webs, and imagining that one is Harry Potter while reading of his adventures doesn't usually 
result in trying to cast spells. Sometimes in the context of make-believe games or Choose Your Own  
Adventure books, people do act on what they imagine. David Velleman (2000) claims that this 
demonstrates imagination to have motivational power, much as belief does. But even then, action on 
imagined means is highly restricted. When playing at making mud pies, children don't usually eat the 
mud. And in Choose Your Own Adventure books, one's real action isn't the imagined action of 
actually entering a time machine, but the believed action of turning to the page corresponding to the 
choice to enter the time machine. Even though action is involved in these cases, the behavioral roles of  
imagination and belief differ. Arguments along these lines from Paul Noordhof (2001), Lucy O'Brien 
(2005), and Neil Van Leeuwen (2009) that carefully consider the relation between imagination and 
motivation seem decisive against Velleman's claim. 
2. Properties of imagination that belief lacks
While there's less agreement about the nature of imagination than about the nature of belief,  
imagination clearly seems to have some properties that belief lacks. These properties provide further  
reasons to regard the two states of mind as fundamentally different, and further obstacles for unified 
approaches.
One difference between belief and imagination is that it's easy to perform an intentional action  
of imagining something that isn't the case. It's hard or impossible to perform an intentional action of  
believing something that isn't the case. (While our desires can affect our beliefs in wishful thinking,  
that typically doesn't involve an intention to believe otherwise.) If I intend to imagine that someone is  
juggling pineapples in front of me, I can do so. But if I intend to believe that someone is juggling  
4
pineapples in front of me, I'll fail. My sensory experiences and other beliefs strongly dispose me to  
believe that there's no pineapple-juggler in front of me. Any intentions to the contrary will be in vain,  
unless (for example) they move me to hire a pineapple-juggler so that I'll form the belief by the  
standard sensory means. Imagination is free from such constraints. While we don't always imagine 
things intentionally -- Amy Kind (2001) provides the example of unintentionally imagining gruesome 
scenes from horror movies that we'd rather get out of our heads (91) -- we can do it if we want.
A second difference is that phenomenology is more closely tied to imagination than to belief.  
Kind provides an example and a strong statement of this view:
Suppose that I were to imagine my friend's orange dress. My imagining clearly has a 
phenomenology. Moreover, the qualitative feel involved in my imagining is essential to it.  
Most importantly, however, there is nothing special about this particular imagining that 
provided it with its phenomenology. No matter what I imagine, my imagining will involve an 
experiential aspect. Without such an experiential aspect, a mental exercise is not an act of  
imagining (93-94). 
She notes an experiment by C.W. Perky (1910) in which subjects faced a blank screen, and were told to  
imagine objects on the screen. Faint images of these objects were projected onto the screen with  
increasing intensity until they'd be visible to anyone entering the room. Subjects asked to imagine a  
banana didn't report having genuine visual images of a banana when a banana was actually projected 
onto the screen. Instead, they said that the imagined banana had simply changed in size or spatial  
orientation. While Robert Hopkins (2012, 2013) argues that the banana images weren't literally 
perceived but were instead pictorially represented in a fashion that doesn't count as perception, Bence 
Nanay (2012) argues that standard views of pictorial representation preserve the conclusion that 
imagining and perceiving "are phenomenally very similar."
If Nanay and Kind's interpretation of Perky's results is correct, imagining and perceiving have 
been experimentally demonstrated to be similar enough that it's hard to tell the difference between 
them. While these cases involve imagining a thing rather than a state of affairs, propositional  
imagination seems similar in its connection to phenomenology. Imagining that one's friend is wearing 
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an orange dress and imagining that there's a banana on the screen seem to have similarly rich 
phenomenological effects. Examples like this can only show that imagination often has a rich  
phenomenology rather than demonstrating that this phenomenology is essential to it. But they still  
provide striking demonstrations of how phenomenologically rich imagining can be. Neuroscience 
provides further empirical evidence of similarities between perception and imagination. Research by 
O'Craven and Kanwisher (2000) demonstrates that imagining faces and places activates very similar 
regions of the brain to those involved in actually seeing those faces and places. 
Belief doesn't have such a strong sensory phenomenology. If it did, evidence from sensation 
couldn't easily change our beliefs. Our beliefs could simply produce nonveridical sensations 
supporting them, even when we were in position to perceive otherwise. Falsely believing that my 
phone is on the bedside table won't create the visual experience of a phone when I look at the bare  
table. Belief and imagination differ in the direction of their strongest causal relation with experience.  
Imagination mainly causes us to experience things as being as we imagine them, while our 
experiences cause us to believe that the world is as we experience it. 
This is not to deny that belief and imagination have intriguing common features. They both 
involve mentally representing the state of affairs that is their content in some way. And while I've  
distinguished their relations to desire and action, they both interact in desire in some way to cause  
pleasure. Humeans like Timothy Schroeder (2004) and myself (2009, forthcoming) note that if you 
desire something strongly, you'll be pleased either when you discover that it's more likely to come 
about, or when you vividly imagine it in a daydream. Perhaps a unified way to describe this 
relationship with desire this is that either believing or imagining something desired causes pleasure, 
in proportion to the degree to which the desired situation is represented.2
I hope the list of differences in this section and the previous one explain why most theorists  
don't see belief and imagination as fundamentally similar. It would be impressive to tell a unified 
story about how the two mental states are basically similar except for some simple fact that explains  
all of their differences. And it's very hard to do, as impressive things often are.
2 See the entry on "Imagination and Desire."
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3. Nichols and Stich on pretense
Shaun Nichols and Stephen Stich's influential paper, "A Cognitive Theory of Pretense", 
provides an account of how the imagination works in cases of pretense. They argue that imaginative 
mental representations are store in an "Imagination Box", separate from the mental compartment in 
which beliefs reside.3 Their main reason for invoking a separate mental compartment for the 
imagination is to explain the phenomenon of "cognitive quarantine" -- how we can believe that things  
are things are a certain way, while imagining that things aren't as we believe them to be. Since beliefs  
and imaginative representations are of different types, believing that not-p and imagining that p are 
compatible.4 Philosophers who use "cognitive" in areas like metaethics should note that in their title it  
doesn't mean "belief-based", but something more like "psychological". A strong psychological  
distinction between believing and imagining is at the core of their view, and allows them to explain  
cognitive quarantine. 
Nichols and Stich, like many theorists addressing psychological questions, seek to describe the  
various types of human mental states and how they interact to cause the observed psychological  
phenomena. A useful metaphor for this purpose is that of several boxes in the mind, one for each type  
of mental state (belief and desire being two examples) in which the contents of the mental states are  
held. To have the content "I am Spider-Man" in the belief box is to believe that one is Spider-Man, to  
have it in the imagination box is to imagine that one is Spider-Man, and to have it in the desire box is  
to desire that one be Spider-Man. Nichols and Stich offer box-and-arrow diagrams displaying these 
mental state types and the causal relations between them that explain psychological phenomena. I can  
imagine that I'm Spider-Man while believing that I'm not Spider-Man because these representations 
are in different boxes. Pairs of contradictory representations don't last long in either the belief nor the  
imagination boxes. To put it in non-boxy terms, it's hard to believe contradictions or imagine 
3 Their original paper calls it the "Possible Worlds Box", and Nichols' later work (2006) renames this 
compartment the "Pretense Box". "Pretense Box" is a better name, as possible worlds are invoked in many 
contexts other than pretense. Doggett and Liao provide the best name, calling it the "Imagination Box", which 
I use here. Like belief, imagination is a type of mental state. Pretense is one among many activities employing 
the mental state of imagination.
4 See Gendler (2003) for further discussion of the phenomena.
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contradictions. So splitting up the pairs to put "I'm not Spider-Man" in the belief box and "I am Spider-
Man" in the imagination box explains how I can pretend I'm Spider-Man despite not believing that I  
am.
Nichols and Stich describe two psychological processes important to understanding how 
imagined scenarios develop. Since our representations of imagined scenarios can change rapidly and 
fluidly in response to new information, they invoke an "UpDater" that changes the contents of the  
Imagination Box. This explains how new events in the course of make-believe games can shift what's  
imagined, just as new evidence can rapidly change our beliefs. For example, if it's in the Imagination  
Box that a teddy bear at a tea party has started drinking vodka instead of tea, the UpDater may add 
the proposition that he'll soon become drunk. And since many new things that happen in pretense  
aren't simply entailed by representations of the pretended scenario and beliefs about how scenarios 
usually play out, they invoke a "Script Elaborator" that fills in additional details of the scenario,  
possibly in creative ways. The introduction of vodka to a properly innocent stuffed animal tea party 
would likely be the product of a mischevous imaginer's Script Elaborator. Nichols and Stich don't say 
much about the processes by which the Script Elaborator works, but one might expect that the agent's  
desires that the imagined scenario proceed in a particular way would play an important role.
Nichols (2008) clarifies further similarities and differences between belief and imagination. The 
emotional effects of imagining the destruction of the world in black comedies like Dr. Strangelove and 
in some philosophical thought experiments, as he notes, are very different from those of believing that  
the world has been destroyed. The difference is not only in degree, but in kind -- one may be amused  
by the way Slim Pickens rides a nuclear bomb to his doom or be intrigued by the thought experiment,  
rather than being horrified by the deaths of billions. He suggests that these differences concern the  
greater flexibility in how desire and imagination can interact to cause emotions.5 If we were to focus 
on the deaths of billions, we'd be overwhelmed by horror, but our desires concerning philosophy and 
black comedy lead us to think about these topics in ways that don't involve imaginative engagement  
with horrific features of the situations. The resulting view treats belief and imagination as different  
5 See the entry on "Fiction and Emotions". 
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mental state types which interact with desire in different ways, but are expressed in a "single code"  
that leads to similar affective responses. 
Views along the lines Nichols and Stich suggest, on which belief and imagining involve 
fundamentally different types of mental states, are described as "the orthodoxy in contemporary 
debates about the imagination" by Sam Liao and Tyler Doggett, who note that they're shared by Currie 
and Ravenscroft (2002), Doggett and Egan (2007, 2011), Kind (2011), and Weinberg and Meskin (2005,  
2006). While Nichols and Stich's distinctive terminology for the psychological components they 
describe hasn't caught on, most philosophers share their view that believing and imagining are deeply 
different states of mind. 
An interesting objection to this orthodoxy comes from Peter Langland-Hassan (2012), who 
argues that pretense doesn't require a distinctive mental state of propositional imagination in addition 
to belief. To make the speech-acts and perform the other actions involved in pretending that teddy 
bears are having a tea party, I merely need to have a variety of beliefs about how one should act in  
make-believe games, and a desire to act as I should. So instead of imagining that the teddy bears like  
tea and acting on desires to affect the imagined scenario in various ways, I believe that I should act as  
if the teddy bears like tea and act on desires to do as I should. On Langland-Hassan's picture, I need  
not believe or imagine simply that the teddy bears like tea -- instead, I believe that the norms of the  
game require me to act as if they do. Since I don't have any attitudes strictly contradicting my belief  
that the teddy bears are inanimate objects who can't like tea, there's no problem of cognitive  
quarantine that would require the addition of a separate mental state type to house the otherwise  
contradictory belief.
While Langland-Hassan provides an elegant theory of the mental states driving our actions in 
cases of pretense, his picture doesn't seem to support a general account of other activities commonly  
explained in terms of imagination. While the behaviors performed in pretense can be understood in 
terms of believing that one should act as if things are different than they actually are, daydreaming 
and engaging with fiction involve less behavior and more phenomenologically rich representations. So 
they seem to require a different treatment that will invoke a distinct cognitive attitude of imagining.  
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Imaginative immersion in pretense -- the topic of the next section -- may require a separate treatment  
as well. So while Langland-Hassan offers us a simpler explanation of one type of imaginative activity,  
it's hard to see how his arguments would lead us to reconceive the mental state of imagination in  
general.
4. Schellenberg on imaginative immersion and the belief-imagination continuum thesis
Now I'll turn to approaches that suggest a continuum between belief and imagination, with 
intermediate states that have some of the properties of each. Susanna Schellenberg (2013) uses cases of  
imaginative immersion to argue that belief and imagination are on a continuum that allows 
intermediate states. Imaginative immersion involves vivid imaginative representations that affect 
action and belief-formation with spontaneity like that of belief. A typical example involves children  
engrossed in make-believe games, acting spontaneously on what they imagine. If two young friends 
are trying to hit each other with sticks while immersed in imagining that they're dueling, they need 
not have explicit thoughts about how striking a friend in reality interacts with the rules of the game to  
constitute the make-believe action of killing the rival and winning the imagined duel. The imagined 
representation that striking would kill the rival interacts with their desire to win the imagined duel as  
spontaneously as beliefs interact with desires, motivating the act of striking. These representations are  
belief-like in how smoothly they seem to interact with desire in motivating action, and also  
imagination-like in representing the imagined scenarios themselves rather than anything genuinely 
believed. There are many similar examples of spontaneous action emerging from imaginative 
immersion in adults, involving method actors and participants in live-action roleplaying games. For 
an example of imaginative immersion in which beliefs interact with each other to produce further  
beliefs rather than interacting with desire to motivate action, consider scientists imagining future 
experiments and forming beliefs about the results. The experience of imagining what would happen 
in an experiment and the experience of coming to believe that these things will happen when the  
experiment will happen may be exactly the same. Schellenberg claims that "the phenomenon of  
imaginative immersion can be fully accounted for only if the functional roles of imaginings and beliefs  
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are understood as being on a continuum" (508). Her view draws support from the seeming unity of 
imagining something and acting or forming a belief that follows from it in these cases. 
If there are states of mind that are produced in the way imaginative representations are and 
not in the way beliefs are, but which also have the effects of belief and not of imagination, they would  
stand in the middle of a continuum between belief and imagination. Schellenberg accepts that we may  
have pure imaginings and pure beliefs at either end of the continuum. She argues that we should also  
countenance mid-continuum states, seeing imaginative immersion as involving a single state of mind 
with the content of imagination as well as the cognitive and motivational effects of belief: "The point is  
that accounting for imaginative immersion requires accounting for the possibility of moving 
seamlessly from mental states that could be called pure imaginings to mental states that are at least to  
some degree belief-like" (509). Invoking one state of mind intermediate between belief and  
imagination makes the transition from imagination-like and belief-like states seamless, as it simply  
involves having one state and doesn't involve extra transitions between states of two different kinds.
Liao and Doggett note some unappealing consequences of Schellenberg's view that being 
immersed in imagination involves a somewhat belief-like state of mind. They offer a case in which a  
mother goes from being dragged into pretending she's a cop in a make-believe game with her 
daughter to becoming "gripped by the game, totally into being a cop" (7). She goes from having 
occurrent beliefs about pretending to be a cop to full imaginative immersion into being a cop, where 
she doesn't have any experience of conscious thought about how she's playing a make-believe game.  
But as they note, "At no time did Mom imagine herself to be a mother who is pretending to be a cop in  
a game or believe herself to be a cop" (7). If imaginative immersion involved a mid-continuum mental  
state with the content "I'm a cop", Mom would to need to believe this instead of imagining it, to  
whatever extent the mental state fell on the belief side of the continuum. Instead, it seems that Mom's  
imaginative immersion instead involves her coming to imagine more and more vividly that she is a 
cop. She need not enter into an even partially belief-like state with the content that she is a cop. Liao  
and Doggett point out that to whatever extent such a state was belief-like, it would be irrational.  
Furthermore, it predicts implausible actions. Mom is unlikely to note that she hasn't received a 
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paycheck from the police department, and make a phone call inquiring about why it hasn't arrived.
Regarding imagination as perceptual rather than belief-like, along the lines suggested by Kind 
(2001), might account for the seamless transition between imaginings and belief-like mental states that  
Schellenberg discusses. If imagining an experiment involves seeing it in one's mind's eye, and  
imagining one's daughter as a robber in a make-believe game involves seeing her as a robber, the 
seamlessness that Schellenberg describes can be explained in terms of how experience causes belief.  
This need not simply be a belief that her daughter is a robber -- all the beliefs can end with "in the  
make-believe game." So mom's experiences make her believe that her daughter is a robber in the 
make-believe game, that catching her daughter will be catching a robber in the make-believe game,  
and so on. Even though sensation and belief are distinct mental states, the transition between them is  
often phenomenologically seamless, just like the transition between imagining and belief in  
imaginative immersion. Perceptual representations of desired objects can seamlessly generate beliefs  
about how to satisfy our desires. When I'm hungry and I see tasty food on my plate, the perceptual  
representation quickly generates belief that it's there and that I can eat it by putting it in my mouth,  
just as imagination seamlessly generates beliefs that the imagined scenario is a particular way and 
performing a particular action will change it in a desired way. In neither case do we need to explicitly  
think about how the imagined or perceived state provides evidence for the means-end belief. 
Understanding imagination as broadly perceptual in this way allows us to achieve the benefits 
of the continuum thesis without accepting it or its drawbacks. Just as the close causal connections  
between sensation and belief don't suggest that there are mental states intermediate between them, the  
close connections between imagination and belief don't suggest that there are mental states in between  
them. Close causal connections don't in general support continuum theses. That smoking causes 
cancer doesn't entail the existence of anything whose nature is on a continuum between smoking and 
cancer. In addition to providing a positive story about imaginative immersion, treating the imagined 
state of affairs as the content of a perception-like state avoids entailing that imaginatively immersed  
people actually believe to some extent that things are as they imagine. So a perceptual account of  
imaginative immersion could provide the benefits of Schellenberg's continuum thesis, without the 
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costs that Liao and Doggett's arguments reveal.
5. Egan on delusions
Another argument for intermediate states between belief and imagination comes from Andy 
Egan, who considers psychological disorders involving delusions. Especially prominent in his 
discussion is Capgras delusion, in which patients claim that their friends, family, or even pets (Wright  
et al, 1994) have been replaced by impostors. A typical example involves a 59-year-old man who 
believed that his wife was such an impostor:
Fred's wife reported that about 15 months from onset he began to see her as a "double" (her  
words). The first episode occurred one day when, after coming home, Fred asked her where 
Wilma was. On her surprised answer that she was right there, he firmly denied that she was 
his wife Wilma, whom he "knew very well as his sons' mother", and went on plainly  
commenting that Wilma had probably gone out and would come back later. (Lucchelli and 
Spinnler, 2007: 189). 
Egan argues that people like Fred don't simply believe that their wives have been replaced by doubles,  
noting that delusions aren't supported by ordinary sensory evidence as beliefs are, and that they 
persist in the face of strong contrary evidence. Their effects on patients' broader belief system and  
behavior aren't as broad as those we might expect from ordinary beliefs. Currie and various co-
authors accommodate these differences between delusions and ordinary beliefs by regarding the 
content of delusions as imagined rather than believed. But as Egan notes, delusions still have some 
belief-like effects, leading patients to sincerely assert that they're dead or that their families have been  
replaced. Their behavioral effects are displayed in sad cases where Capgras patients attack the 
supposed impostors. To accommodate all the belief-like and imagination-like aspects of delusions,  
Egan suggests thinking of them as mental states intermediate between these types. He adds, "We  
shouldn’t expect to see the peculiar hybrid roles all over the place because they're pretty maladaptive" 
(275). Delusions, then, display the existence and maladaptiveness of states in between belief and  
imagination.
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The moral of Egan's story is that we should explore the possibility of mental states that mix  
and match the functional roles we see in familiar states of mind like belief and imagination. He aims at  
"undermining the all-or-nothing-roles view which, if we endorsed it, would rule out such 
intermediate roles, states, and representations" (270). He regards delusions as such intermediate  
representations. 
While Egan is right that patients with delusions aren't just believing or imagining, 
psychologists seem to be converging on a different explanation that invokes no intermediate states of  
mind: Capgras' delusion involves an emotional impairment where one loses the feeling of familiarity 
in looking at a face, causing the delusional belief in an impostor (Bredart and Young 2004). Hadyn 
Ellis and collaborators describe two different psychological pathways involved in facial recognition. 
One pathway is impaired in Capgras' delusion and the other is impaired in a disorder called 
prosopagnosia that leaves patients unable to say whose a face is (Ellis and Young 1990, Ellis and Lewis  
2001). When I look at my friend Ben's face, I can identify the face as Ben's, and I also have a feeling of  
familiarity that I don't have when looking at a stranger's face. This feeling of familiarity has 
physiological effects. Normal subjects have higher skin conductance responses (a bodily indication of  
emotional arousal) when looking at familiar faces than when looking at strangers' faces. If I had 
prosopagnosia, I wouldn't be able to identify the face as Ben's, but I'd still feel the familiarity and have  
the accompanying higher skin conductance. Patients with prosopagnosia have elevated skin 
conductance responses like normal people seeing familiar faces, suggesting that they feel the 
familiarity despite being unable to say whose faces they are (Bauer 1984). And even though they're  
right about which of two faces they've seen before only 53% of the time (barely better than chance),  
they prefer faces they've seen before 70% of the time (Greve and Bauer 1990). This seems to be because  
these faces feel more pleasantly familiar. Capgras delusion is the reverse of prosopagnosia, with  
patients attaching a name to the face, but having neither the feeling of familiarity nor the elevated skin  
conductance (Ellis and Young 1997). Positing two separate aspects of facial recognition explains the 
two separate facial recognition disorders.
This emotional explanation leaves no need for mental states intermediate between belief and 
14
imagination. If I had Capgras delusion and I saw Ben's face, the eerie absence of the usual familiar  
feeling would make me believe that I was looking at an impostor with Ben's face. If I lacked any good  
theory about why this had happened, I might just believe that a stranger had Ben's face, with minimal  
changes to the rest of my belief system. This isn't because imagination is doing anything, but because  
the loss of that specific emotional response only affects a narrow range of beliefs. This can happen  
when we have vivid experiences that contradict a narrow range of beliefs but have little direct bearing 
on other beliefs. If I woke up one morning and it kept looking like my whole body was blue, I'd  
probably come to believe that I was blue but be unsure why. So it wouldn't significantly affect my  
other beliefs. And apart from behaviors directly involving my blue skin (trying to wash the blue off or  
going to a UNC basketball game) I might not act very differently. My confidence that my skin was  
blue might wane if I didn't see myself for a while -- I might think that I was misremembering my past  
experiences or that I'd been in bad light, since my other beliefs generate inferential pressure against  
thinking I'm blue. But seeing myself again would reinforce the belief that I was blue. One could  
understand the epistemic phenomena associated with Capgras' delusion along these lines (Breen,  
Caine, Coltheart 2000).
If the moral of Egan's story is that we should consider new mixes of functional roles, the moral  
of my story is that psychological mysteries are often solved by looking down into perception and 
emotion, not by looking up for fancy new cognitive states. This lets us keep the list of mental states  
tidy and simple -- belief, desire, imagination, attention, and a few others with clearly defined  
properties, as well as the rich assortment of emotional and perceptual states we need to explain the  
richness of experience. Learn about the varieties of perception and emotion, consider how these  
experiences affect belief-formation, and elegant explanations of psychological phenomena will build 
themselves from the bottom up.
6. The norm-application theory
Some philosophers argue that imagining that p is like believing that p, except that it doesn't 
involve applying a norm of truth to one's representation that p, which is necessary for a mental state to 
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be a belief. This norm-application theory of how belief and imagination differ fits nicely with an  
intuitive normative distinction between the two states of mind. One ought to believe what is true,  
while it's not the case that one generally ought to imagine what is true. And most people in fact apply  
the norm of truth to their beliefs but not to their imaginative representations. Norm-application 
theorists don't draw the distinction by saying that believing that p involves believing that p is true. 
Imagining that p also involves imagining that p is true, so this wouldn't successfully distinguish belief 
from imagination. Instead, they hold that having a further mental state that applies a norm of truth to  
a representation that p is necessary for believing that p. If no such norm is applied, the mental state is 
one of imagining that p, or perhaps some similar state like assuming that p for purposes of argument. 
Norm-application theorists differ about which mental state one has when one applies the 
norm. According to John Urmson (1967) and Lloyd Humberstone (1992), it's the mental state of  
intending that a representation be true. So we intend our beliefs to be true, while we have no such  
intention regarding our imaginings. According to Nishi Shah and David Velleman (2005), it's a special 
mental state of accepting a norm of truth, which seems to operate along the lines suggested by Allan  
Gibbard (1990). (None of them take applying the norm to be believing that a norm of truth applies.  
Invoking beliefs about norms to explain the nature of belief would be a circular explanation.) They all  
agree that applying a norm to one's representations is necessary for making them beliefs, at least in  
human psychology, and perhaps in all metaphysically possible believers. Representations where one 
doesn't apply the norm of truth, then, remain in the realm of imagination. 
I've argued (2013) that the necessity claim accepted by norm-application theorists faces 
decisive counterexamples. Ceasing to accept a norm of truth doesn't turn all of one's beliefs into  
imaginings. If Priscilla wholeheartedly embraces a pragmatist view of epistemic norms, and ceases to  
apply norms of truth to any of her mental representations, the necessity claim at the heart of the norm-
application theory entails that she ceases to have any beliefs. With no norm of truth applied to her  
mental representations that p, they all cease to be beliefs that p and become imaginings that p. 
Whatever problems pragmatic or otherwise non-truth-oriented accounts of epistemic norms may 
have, it's bizarre to think that accepting them turns all of one's beliefs about the world into mere acts  
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of imagining. Since one can retain one's beliefs without applying the norm of truth to any of one's  
mental representations, the distinction between belief and imagination can't be that we apply the  
norm of truth to the former and not to the latter. 
It also seems possible to apply a norm of truth to one's imaginative representations without 
turning them into beliefs. If I accept a norm of imagining that someone loves me only if she actually  
loves me, perhaps because I feel that it's unjust to imagine people loving me when they actually don't,  
this doesn't transform my imaginative representations of her love into beliefs. This is especially clear  
in cases where I get carried away and violate my own norm, perhaps with the intensity of my desire  
for her love driving me to uncontrollably fantasize that she loves me. Such cases involve having a 
representation that she loves me and applying the norm of truth to it, so the norm-acceptance theory  
entails that I believe she loves me. But my runaway fantasy that she loves me doesn't become a belief  
that she loves me just because I apply a norm of truth to it. Accepting the norm might make me feel  
guilty even as I fantasized about her love. And if I believed that she loved me, as the norm-application  
theory predicts, why would I feel guilty? I wouldn't believe I was doing anything wrong. All this  
suggests that the norm-acceptance theory can't be reconstructed as providing sufficient conditions for  
turning imagination into belief. 
Accepting and recognizing the consensus that beliefs ought to be true while no such norm 
applies to the imagination, then, shouldn't move one to accept a norm-application theory of the 
distinction between belief and imagination. One can withhold the norm of truth from one's beliefs and 
apply such a norm to one's imaginings without converting one mental state into another. Rather than 
taking belief and imagination to be intrinsically similar forms of representation that differ in virtue of  
whether we apply a further attitude to them, we should see them as differing broadly in their intrinsic  
properties.6
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